Article XXVIII, Colorado Constitution
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Article XXVIII of the Colorado Constitution is entitled Campaign and Political Finance. It has 17 sections.
Article XXVIII was added to the Colorado Constitution by a statewide vote in November 2002 on Colorado Amendment 27, Campaign Finance Regulations.
Section 1
Text of Section 1:
Purposes and Findings. The people of the state of Colorado hereby find and declare that large campaign contributions to political candidates create the potential for corruption and the appearance of corruption; that large campaign contributions made to influence election outcomes allow wealthy individuals, corporations, and special interest groups to exercise a disproportionate level of influence over the political process; that the rising costs of campaigning for political office prevent qualified citizens from running for political office; that because of the use of early voting in Colorado timely notice of independent expenditures is essential for informing the electorate; that in recent years the advent of significant spending on electioneering communications, as defined herein, has frustrated the purpose of existing campaign finance requirements; that independent research has demonstrated that the vast majority of televised electioneering communications goes beyond issue discussion to express electoral advocacy; that political contributions from corporate treasuries are not an indication of popular support for the corporation's political ideas and can unfairly influence the outcome of Colorado elections; and that the interests of the public are best served by limiting campaign contributions, establishing campaign spending limits, providing for full and timely disclosure of campaign contributions, independent expenditures, and funding of electioneering communications, and strong enforcement of campaign finance requirements.[1] |
Amendments
- Colorado Amendment 27, Campaign Finance Regulations (2002), which was approved in November 2002.
- Colorado Corporate Contributions Amendment, Amendment 65 (2012), which was approved on November 6, 2012.
Section 2
Text of Section 2:
Definitions: Section 2. DEFINITIONS For the purpose of this article and any statutory provisions pertaining to campaign finance, including provisions pertaining to disclosure: (1) "Appropriate officer" means the individual with whom a candidate, candidate committee, political committee, small donor committee, or issue committee must file pursuant to section 1-45-109 (1), C.R.S., or any successor section. (2) "Candidate" means any person who seeks nomination or election to any state or local public office that is to be voted on in this state at any primary election, general election, school district election, special district election, or municipal election. "Candidate" also includes a judge or justice of any court of record who seeks to be retained in office pursuant to the provisions of section 25 of article VI. A person is a candidate for election if the person has publicly announced an intention to seek election to public office or retention of a judicial office and thereafter has received a contribution or made an expenditure in support of the candidacy. A person remains a candidate for purposes of this article so long as the candidate maintains a registered candidate committee. A person who maintains a candidate committee after an election cycle, but who has not publicly announced an intention to seek election to public office in the next or any subsequent election cycle, is a candidate for purposes of this article. (3) "Candidate committee" means a person, including the candidate, or persons with the common purpose of receiving contributions or making expenditures under the authority of a candidate. A contribution to a candidate shall be deemed a contribution to the candidate's candidate committee. A candidate shall have only one candidate committee. A candidate committee shall be considered open and active until affirmatively closed by the candidate or by action of the secretary of state. (4) "Conduit" means a person who transmits contributions from more than one person, directly to a candidate committee. "Conduit" does not include the contributor's immediate family members, the candidate or campaign treasurer of the candidate committee receiving the contribution, a volunteer fund raiser hosting an event for a candidate committee, or a professional fund raiser if the fund raiser is compensated at the usual and customary rate. (4.5) "Contract holder" means any non-governmental party to a sole source government contract, including persons that control ten percent or more shares or interestin that party; or that party's officers, directors or trustees; or, in the case of collective bargaining agreements, the labor organization and any political committees created or controlled by the labor organization; Editor's note: Subsection (4.5) was declared unconstitutional (see the editor's note following this section). (5)(a) "Contribution" means: (I) The payment, loan, pledge, gift, or advance of money, or guarantee of a loan, made to any candidate committee, issue committee, political committee, small donor committee, or political party; (II) Any payment made to a third party for the benefit of any candidate committee, issue committee, political committee, small donor committee, or political party; (III) The fair market value of any gift or loan of property made to any candidate committee, issue committee, political committee, small donor committee or political party; (IV) Anything of value given, directly or indirectly, to a candidate for the purpose of promoting the candidate's nomination, retention, recall, or election. (b) "Contribution" does not include services provided without compensation by individuals volunteering their time on behalf of a candidate, candidate committee, political committee, small donor committee, issue committee, or political party; a transfer by a membership organization of a portion of a member's dues to a small donor committee or political committee sponsored by such membership organization; or payments by a corporation or labor organization for the costs of establishing, administering, and soliciting funds from its own employees or members for a political committee or small donor committee. (6) "Election cycle" means either: (a) The period of time beginning thirty-one days following a general election for the particular office and ending thirty days following the next general election for that office; (b) The period of time beginning thirty-one days following a general election for the particular office and ending thirty days following the special legislative election for that office; or (c) The period of time beginning thirty-one days following the special legislative election for the particular office and ending thirty days following the next general election for that office. (7) (a) "Electioneering communication" means any communication broadcasted by television or radio, printed in a newspaper or on a billboard, directly mailed or delivered by hand to personal residences or otherwise distributed that: (I) Unambiguously refers to any candidate; and (II) Is broadcasted, printed, mailed, delivered, or distributed within thirty days before a primary election or sixty days before a general election; and (III) Is broadcasted to, printed in a newspaper distributed to, mailed to, delivered by hand to, or otherwise distributed to an audience that includes members of the electorate for such public office. (b) "Electioneering communication" does not include: (I) Any news articles, editorial endorsements, opinion or commentary writings, or letters to the editor printed in a newspaper, magazine or other periodical not owned or controlled by a candidate or political party; (II) Any editorial endorsements or opinions aired by a broadcast facility not owned or controlled by a candidate or political party; (III) Any communication by persons made in the regular course and scope of their business or any communication made by a membership organization solely to members of such organization and their families; (IV) Any communication that refers to any candidate only as part of the popular name of a bill or statute. (8)(a) "Expenditure" means any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money by any person for the purpose of expressly advocating the electionor defeat of a candidate or supporting or opposing a ballot issue or ballot question. An expenditure is made when the actual spending occurs or when there is a contractual agreement requiring such spending and the amount is determined. (b) "Expenditure" does not include: (I) Any news articles, editorial endorsements, opinion or commentary writings, or letters to the editor printed in a newspaper, magazine or other periodical not owned or controlled by a candidate or political party; (II) Any editorial endorsements or opinions aired by a broadcast facility not owned or controlled by a candidate or political party; (III) Spending by persons, other than political parties, political committees and small donor committees, in the regular course and scope of their business or payments by a membership organization for any communication solely to members and their families; (IV) Any transfer by a membership organization of a portion of a member's dues to a small donor committee or political committee sponsored by such membership organization; or payments made by a corporation or labor organization for the costs of establishing, administering, or soliciting funds from its own employees or members for a political committee or small donor committee. (8.5) "Immediate family member" means any spouse, child, spouse's child, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, parent, sibling, grandparent, grandchild, stepbrother, stepsister, stepparent, parent-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, aunt, niece, nephew, guardian, or domestic partner; Editor's note: Subsection (8.5) was declared unconstitutional (see the editor's note following this section). (9) "Independent expenditure" means an expenditure that is not controlled by or coordinated with any candidate or agent of such candidate. Expenditures that are controlled by or coordinated with a candidate or candidate's agent are deemed to be both contributions by the maker of the expenditures, and expenditures by the candidate committee. (10)(a) "Issue committee" means any person, other than a natural person, or any group of two or more persons, including natural persons: (I) That has a major purpose of supporting or opposing any ballot issue or ballot question; or (II) That has accepted or made contributions or expenditures in excess of two hundred dollars to support or oppose any ballot issue or ballot question. (b) "Issue committee" does not include political parties, political committees, small donor committees, or candidate committees as otherwise defined in this section. (c) An issue committee shall be considered open and active until affirmatively closed by such committee or by action of the appropriate authority. (11) "Person" means any natural person, partnership, committee, association, corporation, labor organization, political party, or other organization or group of persons. (12)(a) "Political committee" means any person, other than a natural person, or any group of two or more persons, including natural persons that have accepted or made contributions or expenditures in excess of $200 to support or oppose the nomination or election of one or more candidates. (b) "Political committee" does not include political parties, issue committees, or candidate committees as otherwise defined in this section. (c) For the purposes of this article, the following are treated as a single political committee: (I) All political committees established, financed, maintained, or controlled by a single corporation or its subsidiaries; (II) All political committees established, financed, maintained, or controlled by a single labor organization; except that, any political committee established, financed, maintained, or controlled by a local unit of the labor organization which has the authority to make a decision independently of the state and national units as to which candidates to support or oppose shall be deemed separate from the political committee of the state and national unit; (III) All political committees established, financed, maintained, or controlled by the same political party; (IV) All political committees established, financed, maintained, or controlled by substantially the same group of persons. (13) "Political party" means any group of registered electors who, by petition or assembly, nominate candidates for the official general election ballot. "Political party" includes affiliated party organizations at the state, county, and election district levels, and all such affiliates are considered to be a single entity for the purposes of this article, except as otherwise provided in section 7. (14)(a) "Small donor committee" means any political committee that has accepted contributions only from natural persons who each contributed no more than fifty dollars in the aggregate per year. For purposes of this section, dues transferred by a membership organization to a small donor committee sponsored by such organization shall be treated as pro-rata contributions from individual members. (b) "Small donor committee" does not include political parties, political committees, issue committees, or candidate committees as otherwise defined in this section. (c) For the purposes of this article, the following are treated as a single small donor committee: (I) All small donor committees established, financed, maintained, or controlled by a single corporation or its subsidiaries; (II) All small donor committees established, financed, maintained, or controlled by a single labor organization; except that, any small donor committee established, financed, maintained, or controlled by a local unit of the labor organization which has the authority to make a decision independently of the state and national units as to which candidates to support or oppose shall be deemed separate from the small donor committee of the state andn ational unit; (III) All small donor committees established, financed, maintained, or controlled by the same political party; (IV) All small donor committees established, financed, maintained, or controlled by substantially the same group of persons. (14.4) "Sole source government contract" means any government contract that does not use a public and competitive bidding process soliciting at least three bids prior toawarding the contract. This provision applies only to government contracts awarded by the state or any of its political subdivisions for amounts greater than one hundred thousand dollars indexed for inflation per the United States bureau of labor statistics consumer price index for Denver-Boulder-Greeley after the year 2012, adjusted every four years, beginning January 1, 2012, to the nearest lowest twenty five dollars. This amount is cumulative and includes all sole source government contracts with any and all governmental entities involving the contract holder during a calendar year. A sole source government contract includes collective bargaining agreements with a labor organization representing employees, but not employment contracts with individual employees. Collective bargaining agreements qualify as sole source government contracts if the contract confers an exclusive representative status to bind all employees to accept the terms and conditions of the contract; Editor's note: Subsection (14.4) was declared unconstitutional (see the editor's note following this section). (14.6) "State or any of its political subdivisions" means the state of Colorado and its agencies or departments, as well as the political subdivisions within this state including counties, municipalities, school districts, special districts, and any public or quasi-public body that receives a majority of its funding from the taxpayers of the state of Colorado. Editor's note: Subsection (14.6) was declared unconstitutional (see the editor's note following this section). (15) "Unexpended campaign contributions" means the balance of funds on hand in any candidate committee at the end of an election cycle, less the amount of all unpaid monetary obligations incurred prior to the election in furtherance of such candidacy. |
Editor's note for Section 2 (click [show] to expand) |
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HISTORY: SOURCE: INITIATED 2002: Entire article added, L. 2003, p. 3597. For the effective date of this article, see the editor's note following the article heading. INITIATED 2008: (4.5), (8.5), (14.4), and (14.6) added, effective December 31, 2008, see L. 2009, p. 3381. EDITOR'S NOTE: Subsection (4.5) was declared unconstitutional (see the editor's note following this section). EDITOR'S NOTE: Subsection (8.5) was declared unconstitutional (see the editor's note following this section). EDITOR'S NOTE: Subsection (14.4) was declared unconstitutional (see the editor's note following this section). EDITOR'S NOTE: Subsection (14.6) was declared unconstitutional (see the editor's note following this section). EDITOR'S NOTE: (1) In 2008, Amendment 54 amended § 13 of this article creating an exception to the effective date stating that the provisions of this article amended or added by Amendment 54 concerning sole source government contracts are effective December 31, 2008; however the Governor's proclamation date on Amendment 54 was January 8, 2009. (2) In the case of DALLMAN V. RITTER, the Denver District Court declared the provisions of subsections (4.5), (8.5), (14.4), and (14.6) unconstitutional and issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of Amendment 54 (see DALLMAN V. RITTER, 225 P.3d 610 (Colo. 2010)). The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling (see DALLMAN V. RITTER, 225 P.3d 610 (Colo. 2010)). CROSS REFERENCES: For the definition of "major purpose", as used in subsection (10)(a)(I), see § 1-45-103 (12)(b). ANNOTATION THE PHRASE "A MAJOR PURPOSE" IN SUBSECTION (10)(A) IS NOT INHERENTLY VAGUE OR OVERBROAD ON ITS FACE. Independence Inst. v. Coffman, 209 P.3d 1130 (Colo. App. 2008); Cerbo v. Protect Colo. Jobs, Inc., 240 P.3d 495 (Colo. App. 2010). DEFINITION OF ISSUE COMMITTEE CONTAINED IN SUBSECTION (10)(A) IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE ON ITS FACE. Administrative law judge considered the length of time nonprofit policy research organization that engaged in ballot advocacy had been in existence, its original purpose and organizational structure, the various issues with which it had been involved, and the amount of money it expended on radio ads. Constitutional provisions need not be so exact as to eliminate any need for such fact-specific analysis. The obvious relevance and ready availability of such information means that any multi-purpose issue committee can assess the burden on its rights to free speech and free association and make an informed decision before undertaking ballot advocacy. Accordingly, organization failed to prove that the term "a major purpose" is invalid in all respects or that it cannot be constitutionally applied to any multi-purpose issue committee. Independence Inst. v. Coffman, 209 P.3d 1130 (Colo. App. 2008), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 479, 130 S. Ct. 625, 175 L. Ed. 2d 479 (2009). DEFINITION OF ISSUE COMMITTEE CONTAINED IN SUBSECTION (10)(A) IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD ON ITS FACE. A law is facially overbroad if it sweeps within its reach a substantial amount of activity that is constitutionally protected. People v. Shepard, 983 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1999); Independence Inst. v. Coffman, 209 P.3d 1130 (Colo. App. 2008), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 479, 130 S. Ct. 625, 175 L. Ed. 2d 479 (2009). Secretary of state had promulgated rules to limit the disclosure and termination requirements for mutli-purpose issue committees. Those rules, which define a multi-purpose issue committee, combined with the fact-specific inquiry that was part of the court's vagueness analysis, provide sufficient guidance as to when a multi-purpose issue committee has "a major purpose" of supporting or opposing a ballot measure. As so interpreted, subsection (10)(a) does not sweep a substantial amount of protected speech within its application. Therefore, the definition is not unconstitutionally overbroad on its face. Independence Inst. v. Coffman, 209 P.3d 1130 (Colo. App. 2008), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 479, 130 S. Ct. 625, 175 L. Ed. 2d 479 (2009). REGISTRATION AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO BALLOT-INITIATIVE COMMITTEE. There is virtually no proper governmental interest in imposing disclosure requirements on ballot-initiative committees that raise and expend minimal money, and limited interest cannot justify the burden that disclosure requirements impose on such a committee. Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2010); Coal. for Secular Gov't v. Williams, 815 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2016). The financial burden of state regulation on ballot initiative committee member's freedom of association approaches or exceeds the value of their financial contributions to their political effort; and the governmental interest in imposing those regulations is minimal, if not nonexistent, in light of the small size of the contributions. Therefore it is unconstitutional to impose that burden on the committee members. Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2010); Coal. for Secular Gov't v. Williams, 815 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2016). THE $200 CONTRIBUTION AND EXPENDITURE THRESHOLD FOR ISSUE COMMITTEES UNDER SUBSECTION (10)(A)(II) AND THE RETROSPECTIVE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR ISSUE COMMITTEES UNDER § 1-45-108 OF THE FAIR CAMPAIGN PRACTICES ACT WERE NOT FACIALLY INVALIDATED BY THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDING IN SAMPSON V. BUESCHER, 625 F.3D 1247 (10TH CIR. 2010). The secretary of state promulgated 8 Colo. Code Regs. 1505-6, § 4.1 (rule 4.1), in response to Sampson. Because rule 4.1's $5,000 threshold and its retrospective reporting exemption clearly conflict with the still-valid constitutional and statutory provisions, rule 4.1 is unlawful and set aside. The secretary exceeded his authority in promulgating the rule. Gessler v. CO Common Cause & Ethics Watch, 2014 CO 44, 327 P.3d 232. Although in promulgating rule 4.27 (later codified as rule 4.1), the secretary was attempting to clarify the registration and reporting requirements in light of Sampson, Sampson did not facially invalidate any provision of the campaign finance law, and, to the extent Sampson impacts the future application of campaign finance laws on issue committees in a similar factual context, rule 4.27 exceeds the scope of Sampson. Colo. Common Cause v. Gessler, 2012 COA 147, -- P.3d --, aff'd, 2014 CO 44, 327 P.3d 232. THE PHRASE "GIVEN, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, TO A CANDIDATE FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROMOTING THE CANDIDATE'S . . . ELECTION" AS USED IN THE DEFINITION OF "CONTRIBUTION" in subsection (5)(a)(IV) and as incorporated by reference in § 1-45-103 (6)(a) requires that (1) a thing of value (2) be put into the possession of or provided to a candidate or someone acting on the candidate's behalf (3) with the intention that the candidate receive or make use of the thing of value provided (4) in order to promote the candidate's election. Keim v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 2015 COA 61, -- P.3d --. UNDER DEFINITION OF ISSUE COMMITTEE IN SUBSECTION (10)(A), AN ORGANIZATION HAS A "MAJOR PURPOSE" OF SUPPORTING A BALLOT ISSUE IF SUCH SUPPORT "CONSTITUTES A CONSIDERABLE OR PRINCIPAL PORTION OF THE ORGANIZATIONS'S TOTAL ACTIVITIES". Cerbo v. Protect Colo. Jobs, Inc., 240 P.3d 495 (Colo. App. 2010). Facts in record demonstrate that nonprofit organization had a major purpose of supporting proposed ballot issue. Cerbo v. Protect Colo. Jobs, Inc., 240 P.3d 495 (Colo. App. 2010). ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE (ALJ) ERRED IN HER ANALYSIS OF MAJOR PURPOSE ISSUE BY (1) placing undue weight on fact organization had purposes other than supporting a proposed initiative; (2) giving too much weight to activities that organization merely considered undertaking while giving too little weight to what it actually did; and (3) failing to give weight to other factors relevant to the inquiry. Cerbo v. Protect Colo. Jobs, Inc., 240 P.3d 495 (Colo. App. 2010). NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION HAS A "MAJOR PURPOSE" OF SUPPORTING A BALLOT ISSUE WHEN it is created at same time ballot issue is conceived, is operated and represented by individuals otherwise intimately involved in drafting and promoting the ballot issue individually and through other organizations, spends its entire first year promoting the ballot issue to the exclusion of almost all other activities, and spends three-fourths of all the funds it has ever expended promoting the ballot issue. Cerbo v. Protect Colo. Jobs, Inc., 240 P.3d 495 (Colo. App. 2010). DEFINITION OF A POLITICAL COMMITTEE IN SUBSECTION (12)(A) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED to non-profit ideological corporation because it fails to incorporate Buckley v. Valeo's "major purpose" test. Colo. Right to Life Comm. v. Coffman, 498 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 2007). "EXPRESSLY ADVOCATING" FOR PURPOSES OF THE DEFINITION OF EXPENDITURE IN SUBSECTION (8) OF THIS SECTION IS LIMITED TO SPEECH THAT EXPLICITLY EXHORTS THE VIEWER OR READER TO VOTE FOR OR AGAINST A CANDIDATE IN AN UPCOMING ELECTION USING EITHER THE "MAGIC WORDS" DESCRIBED IN BUCKLY V. VALEO, 424 U.S. 1, 44 N.52 (1976), OR SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR WORDS. The court declined to adopt a functional equivalence test for "express advocacy" that would be difficult to apply and unconstitutionally chill political speech. None of the 17 ads at issue contained any of the magic words or substantially similar synonyms. Accordingly, because none of the ads constituted "expenditures", neither of the two political organizations that distributed the ads were subject to regulation as "political committees". Colo. Ethics v. Senate Majority Fund, LLC, 2012 CO 12, 269 P.3d 1248. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE (ALJ) DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT DEFINITION OF "EXPENDITURES" DID NOT APPLY TO METROPOLITAN DISTRICT BOARDS. Respondents had argued that the metropolitan districts qualified as "persons" that could expend payments on behalf of issue committee supporting ballot issue. Even if the definition of "person" could be stretched to cover political subdivisions of the state such as metropolitan districts, respondents failed to explain how the payments at issue were "made with the prior knowledge and consent of an agent" of the issue committee that was not yet formed in order to bring such payments within the definition of "expenditure". Skruch v. Highlands Ranch Metro. Dists., 107 P.3d 1140 (Colo. App. 2004). ALJ DID NOT ERR BY INTERPRETING "EXPENDITURE" TO OCCUR WHEN A PAYMENT IS MADE AND WHEN THERE IS A CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT AND THE AMOUNT IS DETERMINED. The use of the disjunctive "or" in the definition of "expenditure" indicates that an expenditure is made if either criterion is met after the ballot title is submitted. Skruch v. Highlands Ranch Metro. Dists., 107 P.3d 1140 (Colo. App. 2004). PAYMENT BY UNIONS OF STAFF SALARIES FOR TIME SPENT ORGANIZING WALKS TO DISTRIBUTE POLITICAL LITERATURE AND PAYMENTS OF OTHER COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH RELATED POLITICAL ACTIVITIES DID NOT CONSTITUTE PROHIBITED EXPENDITURES IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(4)(A) OF THIS ARTICLE. Whether payments made by the union are prohibited as "expenditures" depends upon whether they are exempt from regulation by the membership communication exception in subsection (8)(b)(III) of this section as payments for "any communication solely to members and their families". The membership communication exception must be construed broadly to reflect the plain language of this constitutional provision and to satisfy the demands of the first amendment. The membership communication exception as construed applies to most of the union's activities in this case. To the extent that the challenged union activities are not embraced by the membership communication exception, the administrative law judge correctly held that person filing campaign finance complaint failed to prove facts demonstrating that an expenditure was made. Colo. Educ. Ass'n v. Rutt, 184 P.3d 65 (Colo. 2008). THE MEMBERSHIP COMMUNICATION EXCEPTION FOUND IN SUBSECTION (8)(B)(III) MUST BE EXTENDED TO AND EMBRACED WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF "CONTRIBUTION". To hold otherwise nullifies the exception. The same conduct may not be protected by the membership communication exception to expenditures, that is, treated as an exempt expenditure, yet, at the same time, be prohibited as a non-exempt contribution. Such a result would be contrary to the intent of the electorate and constitute an unreasonable and disharmonious application of this article. Colo. Educ. Ass'n v. Rutt, 184 P.3d 65 (Colo. 2008). UNIONS' CHALLENGED CONDUCT DOES NOT MEET THE PERTINENT DEFINITIONS OF A CONTRIBUTION UNDER SUBSECTION (5)(A)(II) AND (5)(A)(IV) OF THIS SECTION AND § 1-45-103 (6). Facts may reasonably be viewed in two contradictory ways: One advancing the union's argument that the payment of union staff salaries for organizing political events were paid for the benefit of the unions and their members and thus exempt from regulation; the other that the payments constituted payments made to a third party for the benefit of the candidate or anything of value given indirectly to the candidate and, thus, were prohibited contributions. When the first amendment is at stake, the tie goes to the speaker rather than to censorship and regulation. On the facts of this case, the unions did not make any prohibited contributions in violation of section 3(4)(a) of this article. Colo. Educ. Ass'n v. Rutt, 184 P.3d 65 (Colo. 2008). COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT'S DISSEMINATION OF A REPORT ON EDUCATION POLICY ISSUED BY A NATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY ORGANIZATION IS NOT A "CONTRIBUTION" IN VIOLATION OF § 1-45-117 (1)(A)(I). Keim v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 2015 COA 61, -- P.3d --. There is no evidence that the report was given, directly or indirectly, to a candidate for the purpose of promoting that candidate's election. Nor is there any evidence that the district distributed the report with the intention that a particular candidate would eventually receive or make use of it. Keim v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 2015 COA 61, -- P.3d --. BECAUSE COORDINATION, AS A CONCEPT OR AS A MATTER OF LAW, IS NOT REQUIRED TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF THE MAKER OF A CONTRIBUTION UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, COURT DECLINES TO IMPOSE A REQUIREMENT OF COORDINATION ON THE DEFINITION OF CONTRIBUTION TO SATISFY FIRST AMENDMENT REQUIREMENTS. While a finding of coordination may be necessary to protect the recipient of an indirect contribution from unwittingly violating this article, that issue is not raised by this case. Colo. Educ. Ass'n v. Rutt, 184 P.3d 65 (Colo. 2008). ORDER BY ALJ ASSESSING PENALTY AGAINST NONPROFIT ASSOCIATION ENGAGING IN POLITICAL ADVOCACY BASED UPON DETERMINATION BY ALJ THAT ASSOCIATION WAS A POLITICAL COMMITTEE IS VACATED AND CASE REMANDED. Under controlling precedent, regulation under campaign finance laws should be tied to groups controlled by candidates or which have a "major purpose" of electing candidates. Here, record does not permit a determination of whether major purpose test satisfied as to association. On remand, ALJ instructed to determine whether association's "major purpose" in 2004 was the nomination or election of candidates. Alliance for Colorado's Families v. Gilbert, 172 P.3d 964 (Colo. App. 2007). COURT REJECTS INTERPRETATION OF SUBSECTION (5)(A)(IV) AND § 1-45-103 (6)(A) UNDER WHICH A CITY EMPLOYEE WOULD BE BARRED FROM PROVIDING TO A CANDIDATE FOR ELECTED OFFICE ANYTHING OF VALUE THAT HAD THE EFFECT OF PROMOTING THE CANDIDATE'S ELECTION. ALJ correctly construed the relevant phrase "for the purpose of" in subsection (5)(a)(IV) in accordance with its plain meaning to indicate an anticipated result that is intended or desired. Court rejects construction under which phrase would mean "with the effect of". Such a construction would improperly conflate the distinct concepts of purpose and effect. Such an interpretation would also lead to unintended consequences far beyond the scope of issues presented in the case. CEW v. City & County of Broomfield, 203 P.3d 623 (Colo. App. 2009). SINCE EFFECT OF CITY EMPLOYEES' ACTIONS, RATHER THAN THEIR INTENT, IS TO BE EXAMINED, COURT FURTHER REJECTS ARGUMENT THAT INTENT IS TO BE GAUGED BY OBJECTIVE RATHER THAN SUBJECTIVE CRITERIA. Inquiry into purpose requires examination of the intent of the person alleged to have made a campaign contribution. ALJ considered evidence concerning the city employees' intent and determined, on the basis of substantial evidence in the record, that organization bringing campaign finance complaint had not met its burden of proving that the employees provided services for the purpose of promoting a campaign even though employees knew information would be helpful to the candidates to whom the information was provided. Organization's interpretation improperly equates knowledge of the possible effects of one's actions with an intent to achieve a particular result. Accordingly, ALJ correctly determined that city's contribution of staff time was not "for the purpose of" promoting a political campaign. CEW v. City & County of Broomfield, 203 P.3d 623 (Colo. App. 2009). TELEVISION ADVERTISEMENTS URGING VOTERS TO OPPOSE INCUMBENT MEMBER MET THE DEFINITION OF ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATIONS UNDER SUBSECTION (7)(A). Unambiguous reference to "any communication" in definition does not distinguish between express advocacy and advocacy that is not express. Further, subsection (7)(a) is triggered when a communication is made within 30 days before a primary election or 60 days before a general election, without regard to the communication's purpose. Colo. Citizens for Ethics in Gov't v. Comm. for the Am. Dream, 187 P.3d 1207 (Colo. App. 2008). SUBSECTION (7)(A) OF THIS SECTION DEFINES "ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATION" TO INCLUDE ALL COMMUNICATION THAT "[U]NAMBIGUOUSLY REFERS TO ANY CANDIDATE". But the secretary of state's proposed rule, 8 Colo. Code Regs. 1505-6, § 1.7, defines it only as communication that is the functional equivalent of express advocacy. Thus the plain language of the rule restricts the type of communication that would fall in the category of "electioneering communication" because it adds a "functional equivalence" test. Accordingly, the rule is invalid because the constitutional provisions are clear and unambiguous that all communication unambiguously referring to a candidate is electioneering communication, leaving no gap for the secretary to fill. Although the secretary's attempt to conform subsection (7)(a) of this section to first amendment standards is understandable, it exceeds his authority to "administer and enforce" the law. Colo. Ethics Watch v. Gessler, 2013 COA 172M, 363 P.3d 727. REGULAR BUSINESS EXCEPTION IN SUBSECTION (7)(B)(III) is limited to persons whose business is to broadcast, print, publicly display, directly mail, or hand deliver candidate-specific communications within the named candidate's district as a service rather than to influence elections. Wording of exception shows that the phrase "in the regular course and scope of their business" does not apply to political committees. Accordingly, political committee does not come within the regular business exception. Colo. Citizens for Ethics in Gov't v. Comm. for the Am. Dream, 187 P.3d 1207 (Colo. App. 2008). A JUDICIAL OFFICER SEEKING RETENTION IS A CANDIDATE FOR PURPOSES OF THE DEFINITION OF "CANDIDATE" IN SUBSECTION (2). Further, a judicial retention vote is an election for purposes of the definition of "political committee" in subsection (12)(a). Colo. Ethics Watch v. Clear the Bench, 2012 COA 42, 277 P.3d 931. AN ORGANIZATION THAT SUPPORTS OR OPPOSES THE RETENTION OF A JUDICIAL OFFICER IS A POLITICAL COMMITTEE BECAUSE IT SUPPORTS OR OPPOSES THE ELECTION OF A CANDIDATE AND BECAUSE IT IS RECOGNIZED AS SUCH BY § 1-45-109 (1)(A)(I). Organization accepted contributions and made expenditures of over $200 to oppose the retention of three justices of the Colorado supreme court. It is, therefore, a political committee. Organization cannot be both a political committee and issue committee because the two are defined under subsections (10) and (12) to be mutually exclusive. Colo. Ethics Watch v. Clear the Bench, 2012 COA 42, 277 P.3d 931. THE LANGUAGE IN ART. VI, § 3, STATING THAT "A QUESTION SHALL BE PLACED ON THE . . . BALLOT" DOES NOT RENDER JUDICIAL RETENTION A "BALLOT QUESTION" FOR PURPOSES OF THE FAIR CAMPAIGN PRACTICES ACT (FCPA). A judicial retention vote is not a "ballot question" because it does not involve a citizen petition or referred measure. Because a judicial retention vote does not meet the definition of a "ballot issue" or "ballot question" contained in the FCPA, organization opposing retention of three justices is not an issue committee under subsection (10). Colo. Ethics Watch v. Clear the Bench, 2012 COA 42, 277 P.3d 931. BECAUSE AMENDMENT 54'S PROHIBITIONS DO NOT SERVE A SUFFICIENTLY IMPORTANT INTEREST IN THIS CASE, ITS ORGANIZED LABOR PROVISIONS, SPECIFICALLY SUBSECTIONS (4.5) AND (14.4), VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT. Subsection (4.5) leaves labor organizations involved in collective bargaining with no political voice either through their own direct contributions or through any affiliated political committee. Because there are other, more discrete options to limit corruption without completely stifling speech, subsection (4.5) is not closely drawn. Moreover, the attributes of a negotiated collective bargaining agreement make the potential of pay-to-play corruption in connection with such agreement exceedingly remote, so the government lacks a sufficiently important interest to justify this sort of heavy-handed regulation. Dallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610 (Colo. 2010). BECAUSE THERE IS NO COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST UNDERLYING THE DISPARATE TREATMENT OF DIFFERENT SOLE SOURCE CONTRACTORS, AMENDMENT 54'S PROVISIONS APPLYING TO LABOR ORGANIZATIONS ALSO VIOLATE THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT'S EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. Under subsection (4.5), amendment 54 prohibits contributions by a labor organization or any of its affiliated political committees, but it does not restrict contributions by political committees affiliated with any other type of donor, such as private corporations. By prohibiting both unions and their political committees from making contributions, amendment 54 completely strips unions of any political voice, while still allowing corporations to particulate through their own political committees. Dallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610 (Colo. 2010). RESTRICTION IN SECTION 15 ON CONTRIBUTIONS FROM "IMMEDIATE FAMILY MEMBERS" AS DEFINED IN SUBSECTION (8.5) IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD. State law already prohibits one of the main concerns of this section -- that a family member will make a contribution in his or her own name while using the funds of another. Section 15 expands the scope of prohibited conduit contributions and increases the penalty in a manner disproportionate to its purpose. Therefore, amendment 54's prohibition on contributions made on behalf of immediate family members serves to substantially chill speech and does little to further its purpose of eliminating the appearance of impropriety. Dallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610 (Colo. 2010). COURT REQUIRED TO SEVER ALL OF AMENDMENT 54'S ADDITIONS TO THIS SECTION. Both subsections (8.5) and (14.6) overbroadly apply amendment to families and government. Court required to strike as unconstitutional the application of subsection (4.5) to organized labor. Subsection (14.4) uses phrases that are overbroad as written. Also, its application to collective bargaining agreements is improperly tailored. These breadth and tailoring problems leave subsection (14.4) with no cognizable application. Amendment 54's purposes provide no standard by which to rewrite defective definitions. Court is in no position to arbitrarily decide to whom and to what types of government contracts amendment 54 should apply -- that is the role of the lawmaking body, the people in this case. Dallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610 (Colo. 2010). DEFICIENCIES IN AMENDMENT 54 SO PERVASIVE AS TO RENDER IT WHOLLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Despite the constitutionality of some limited phrases and portions, amendment 54 is so incomplete or riddled with omissions that it cannot be salvaged as a meaningful legislative enactment. Dallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610 (Colo. 2010). |
Section 3
Text of Section 3:
Contribution Limits: (1) Except as described in subsections (2), (3), and (4) of this section, no person, including a political committee, shall make to a candidate committee, and no candidate committee shall accept from any one person, aggregate contributions for a primary or a general election in excess of the following amounts:
(2) No small donor committee shall make to a candidate committee, and no candidate committee shall accept from any one small donor committee, aggregate contributions for a primary or a general election in excess of the following amounts:
(3)
(4)
(5) No political committee shall accept aggregate contributions or pro-rata dues from any person in excess of five hundred dollars per house of representatives election cycle. (6) No candidate's candidate committee shall accept contributions from, or make contributions to, another candidate committee, including any candidate committee, or equivalent entity, established under federal law. (7) No person shall act as a conduit for a contribution to a candidate committee. (8) Notwithstanding any other section of this article to the contrary, a candidate's candidate committee may receive a loan from a financial institution organized under state or federal law if the loan bears the usual and customary interest rate, is made on a basis that assures repayment, is evidenced by a written instrument, and is subject to a due date or amortization schedule. The contribution limits described in this section shall not apply to a loan as described in this subsection (8). (9) All contributions received by a candidate committee, issue committee, political committee, small donor committee, or political party shall be deposited in a financial institution in a separate account whose title shall include the name of the committee or political party. All records pertaining to such accounts shall be maintained by the committee or political party for one-hundred eighty days following any general election in which the committee or party received contributions unless a complaint is filed, in which case they shall be maintained until final disposition of the complaint and any consequent litigation. Such records shall be subject to inspection at any hearing held pursuant to this article. (10) No candidate committee, political committee, small donor committee, issue committee, or political party shall accept a contribution, or make an expenditure, in currency or coin exceeding one hundred dollars. (11) No person shall make a contribution to a candidate committee, issue committee, political committee, small donor committee, or political party with the expectation that some or all of the amounts of such contribution will be reimbursed by another person. No person shall be reimbursed for a contribution made to any candidate committee, issue committee, political committee, small donor committee, or political party, nor shall any person make such reimbursement except as provided in subsection (8) of this section. (12) No candidate committee, political committee, small donor committee, or political party shall knowingly accept contributions from:
(13) Each limit on contributions described in subsections (1), (2), (3)(a), (3)(b) and (5) of this section, and subsection (14) of section 2, shall be adjusted by an amount based upon the percentage change over a four year period in the United States bureau of labor statistics consumer price index for Denver- Boulder-Greeley, all items, all consumers, or its successor index, rounded to the nearest lowest twenty-five dollars. The first adjustment shall be done in the first quarter of 2007 and then every four years thereafter. The secretary of state shall calculate such an adjustment in each limit and specify the limits in rules promulgated in accordance with article 4 of title 24, C.R.S., or any successor section. |
Amendments
- Colorado Amendment 27, Campaign Finance Regulations (2002), which was approved in November 2002.[1]
Editor's notes (click [show] to expand) |
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Section 4
Text of Section 4:
Voluntary Campaign Spending Limits: (1) Candidates may certify to the secretary of state that the candidate's candidate committee shall not exceed the following spending limits for the applicable election cycle: (a) Two and one-half million dollars combined for a candidate for governor and governor and lieutenant governor as joint candidates under 1-1-104, C.R.S., or any successor section; (b) Five hundred thousand dollars for a candidate for secretary of state, attorney general, or treasurer; (c) Ninety thousand dollars for a candidate for the state senate; (d) Sixty-five thousand dollars for a candidate for the state house of representatives, state board of education, regent of the university of Colorado, or district attorney. (2) Candidates accepting the campaign spending limits set forth above shall also agree that their personal contributions to their own campaign shall be counted as political party contributions and subject to the aggregate limit on such contributions set forth in section 3 of this article. (3) Each candidate who chooses to accept the applicable voluntary spending limit shall file a statement to that effect with the secretary of state at the time that the candidate files a candidate affidavit as currently set forth in section 1-45-110(1), C.R.S., or any successor section. Acceptance of the applicable voluntary spending limit shall be irrevocable except as set forth in subsection (4) of this section and shall subject the candidate to the penalties set forth in section 10 of this article for exceeding the limit. (4) If a candidate accepts the applicable spending limit and another candidate for the same office refuses to accept the spending limit, the accepting candidate shall have ten days in which to withdraw acceptance. The accepting candidate shall have this option of withdrawing acceptance after each additional non-accepting candidate for the same office enters the race. (5) The applicable contribution limits set forth in section 3 of this article shall double for any candidate who has accepted the applicable voluntary spending limit if: (a) Another candidate in the race for the same office has not accepted the voluntary spending limit; and (b) The non-accepting candidate has raised more than ten percent of the applicable voluntary spending limit. (6) Only those candidates who have agreed to abide by the applicable voluntary spending limit may advertise their compliance. All other candidates are prohibited from advertising, or in any way implying, their acceptance of voluntary spending limits. (7) Each spending limit described in subsection (1) of this section shall be adjusted by an amount based upon the percentage change over a four year period in the United States bureau of labor statistics consumer price index for Denver-Boulder-Greeley, all items, all consumers, or its successor index, rounded to the nearest lowest twenty-five dollars. The first adjustment shall be done in the first quarter of 2007 and then every four years thereafter. The secretary of state shall calculate such an adjustment in each limit and specify the limits in rules promulgated in accordance with article 4 of title 24, C.R.S., or any successor section.[1] |
Amendments
- Colorado Amendment 27, Campaign Finance Regulations (2002), which was approved in November 2002.
Section 5
Text of Section 5:
Independent Expenditures: (1) Any person making an independent expenditure in excess of one thousand dollars per calendar year shall deliver notice in writing to the secretary of state of such independent expenditure, as well as the amount of such expenditure, and a detailed description of the use of such independent expenditure. The notice shall specifically state the name of the candidate whom the independent expenditure is intended to support or oppose. Each independent expenditure in excess of one-thousand dollars shall require the delivery of a new notice. Any person making an independent expenditure within thirty days of a primary or general election shall deliver such notice within forty-eight hours after obligating funds for such expenditure. (2) Any person making an independent expenditure in excess of one thousand dollars shall disclose, in the communication produced by the expenditure, the name of the person making the expenditure and the specific statement that the advertisement of material is not authorized by any candidate. Such disclosure shall be prominently featured in the communication. (3) Expenditures by any person on behalf of a candidate for public office that are coordinated with or controlled by the candidate or the candidate's agent, or political party shall be considered a contribution to the candidate's candidate committee, or the political party, respectively. (4) This section 5 applies only to independent expenditures made for the purpose of expressly advocating the defeat or election of any candidate.[1] |
Amendments
- Colorado Amendment 27, Campaign Finance Regulations (2002), which was approved in November 2002.
Section 6
Text of Section 6:
Electioneering Communications: |
Amendments
- Colorado Amendment 27, Campaign Finance Regulations (2002), which was approved in November 2002.[1]
Section 7
Text of Section 7:
Disclosures: The disclosure requirements relevant to candidate committees, political committees, issue committees, and political parties, that are currently set forth in section 1-45-108, C.R.S., or any successor section, shall be extended to include small donor committees. The disclosure requirements of section 1-45-108, C.R.S., or any successor section, shall be extended to require disclosure of the occupation and employer of each person who has made a contribution of one hundred dollars or more to a candidate committee, political committee, issue committee, or political party. For purposes of this section and 1-45-108, C.R.S., or any successor section, a political party shall be treated as separate entities at the state, county, district, and local levels.[1] |
Amendments
- Colorado Amendment 27, Campaign Finance Regulations (2002), which was approved in November 2002.
Section 8
Text of Section 8:
Filing - Where to File - Timeliness: The secretary of state shall promulgate rules relating to filing in accordance with article 4 of title 24, C.R.S., or any successor section. The rules promulgated pursuant to this section shall extend section 1- 45-109, C.R.S., or any successor section to apply to small donor committees.[1] |
Amendments
- Colorado Amendment 27, Campaign Finance Regulations (2002), which was approved in November 2002.
Section 9
Text of Section 9:
Duties of the Secretary of State - Enforcement: (1) The secretary of state shall: (a) Prepare forms and instructions to assist candidates and the public in complying with the reporting requirements of this article and make such forms and instructions available to the public, municipal clerks, and county clerk and recorders free of charge; (b) Promulgate such rules, in accordance with article 4 of title 24, C.R.S., or any successor section, as may be necessary to administer and enforce any provision of this article; (c) Prepare forms for candidates to declare their voluntary acceptance of the campaign spending limits set forth in section 4 of this article. Such forms shall include an acknowledgment that the candidate voluntarily accepts the applicable spending limit and that the candidate swears to abide by those spending limits. These forms shall be signed by the candidate under oath, notarized, filed with the secretary of state, and available to the public upon request; (c) Maintain a filing and indexing system consistent with the purposes of this article; (e) Make the reports and statements filed with the secretary of state's office available immediately for public inspection and copying. The secretary of state may charge a reasonable fee for providing copies of reports. No information copied from such reports shall be sold or used by any person for the purpose of soliciting contributions or for any commercial purpose; (f) Refer any complaints filed against any candidate for the office of secretary of state to the attorney general. Any administrative law judge employed pursuant to this section shall be appointed pursuant to part 10 of article 30 of title 24, C.R.S., or any successor section. Any hearing conducted by an administrative law judge employed pursuant to subsection (2) of this section shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 24-4-105, C.R.S., or any successor section. (2)(a) Any person who believes that a violation of section 3, section 4, section 5, section 6, section 7, or section 9 (1) (e), of this article, or of sections 1-45-108, 1-45-114, 1-45-115, or 1-45-117 C.R.S., or any successor sections, has occurred may file a written complaint with the secretary of state no later than one hundred eighty days after the date of the alleged violation. The secretary of state shall refer the complaint to an administrative law judge within three days of the filing of the complaint. The administrative law judge shall hold a hearing within fifteen days of the referral of the complaint, and shall render a decision within fifteen days of the hearing. The defendant shall be granted an extension of up to thirty days upon defendant's motion, or longer upon a showing of good cause. If the administrative law judge determines that such violation has occurred, such decision shall include any appropriate order, sanction, or relief authorized by this article. The decision of the administrative law judge shall be final and subject to review by the court of appeals, pursuant to section 24-4-106 (11), C.R.S., or any successor section. The secretary of state and the administrative law judge are not necessary parties to the review. The decision may be enforced by the secretary of state, or, if the secretary of state does not file an enforcement action within thirty days of the decision, in a private cause of action by the person filing the complaint. Any private action brought under this section shall be brought within one year of the date of the violation in state district court. The prevailing party in a private enforcement action shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys fees and costs. (b) The attorney general shall investigate complaints made against any candidate for the office of secretary of state using the same procedures set forth in paragraph (a) of this subsection (2). Complainant shall have the same private right of action as under paragraph (a) of this subsection (2). (c) A subpoena issued by an administrative law judge requiring the production of documents by an issue committee shall be limited to documents pertaining to contributions to, or expenditures from, the committee's separate account established pursuant to section 3(9) of this article to support or oppose a ballot issue or ballot question. A subpoena shall not be limited in this manner where such issue committee fails to form a separate account through which a ballot issue or ballot question is supported or opposed. [1] |
Amendments
- Colorado Amendment 27, Campaign Finance Regulations (2002), which was approved in November 2002.
Section 10
Text of Section 10:
Filing - Where to File - Timeliness: (1) Any person who violates any provision of this article relating to contribution or voluntary spending limits shall be subject to a civil penalty of at least double and up to five times the amount contributed, received, or spent in violation of the applicable provision of this article. Candidates shall be personally liable for penalties imposed upon the candidate's committee. (2)(a) The appropriate officer shall impose a penalty of fifty dollars per day for each day that a statement or other information required to be filed pursuant to section 5, section 6, or section 7 of this article, or sections 1-45-108, 1-45-109 or 1-45-110, C.R.S., or any successor sections, is not filed by the close of business on the day due. Upon imposition of a penalty pursuant to this subsection (2), the appropriate officer shall send the person upon whom the penalty is being imposed proper notification by certified mail of the imposition of the penalty. If an electronic mail address is on file with the secretary of state, the secretary of state shall also provide such notification by electronic mail. Revenues collected from fees and penalties assessed by the secretary of state or revenues collected in the form of payment of the secretary of state's attorney fees and costs pursuant to this article shall be deposited in the department of state cash fund created in section 24-21-104 (3), C.R.S., or any successor section. (b)(I) Any person required to file a report with the secretary of state and upon whom a penalty has been imposed pursuant to this subsection (2) may appeal such penalty by filing a written appeal with the secretary of state no later than thirty days after the date on which notification of the imposition of the penalty was mailed to such person's last known address in accordance with paragraph (a) of this subsection (2). Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this subsection (2), the secretary shall refer the appeal to an administrative law judge. Any hearing conducted by an administrative law judge pursuant to this subsection (2) shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 24-4-105, C.R.S., or any successor section. The administrative law judge shall set aside or reduce the penalty upon a showing of good cause, and the person filing the appeal shall bear the burden of proof. The decision of the administrative law judge shall be final and subject to review by the court of appeals pursuant to section 24-4-106 (11), C.R.S., or any successor section. (II) If the administrative law judge finds that the filing of an appeal brought pursuant to sub paragraph (I) of this paragraph (b) was frivolous, groundless, or vexatious, the administrative law judge shall order the person filing the appeal to pay reasonable attorney fees and costs of the secretary of state in connection with such proceeding. (c) Upon receipt by the secretary of state of an appeal pursuant to paragraph (b) of this subsection (2), the secretary shall set aside or reduce the penalty upon a showing of good cause. (d) Any unpaid debt owing to the state resulting from a penalty imposed pursuant to this subsection (2) shall be collected by the state in accordance with the requirements of section 24-30-202.4, C.R.S., or any successor section. (3) Failure to comply with the provisions of this article shall have no effect on the validity of any election.[1] |
Amendments
- Colorado Amendment 27, Campaign Finance Regulations (2002), which was approved in November 2002.
Section 11
Text of Section 11:
Conflicting Provisions Declared Inapplicable: Any provisions in the statutes of this state in conflict or inconsistent with this article are hereby declared to be inapplicable to the matters covered and provided for in this article.[1] |
Amendments
- Colorado Amendment 27, Campaign Finance Regulations (2002), which was approved in November 2002.
Section 12
Text of Section 12:
Repeal of Conflicting Statutory Provisions: Sections 1-45-103, 1-45-105.3, 1-45-107, 1-45-111, and 1-45-113 are repealed.[1] |
Repealed with the approval of Colorado Amendment 27, Campaign Finance Regulations (2002)in November 2002.
Section 13
Text of Section 13:
Applicability and Effective Date: |
Amendments
- Colorado Amendment 27, Campaign Finance Regulations (2002), which was approved in November 2002.
- Colorado Campaign Contributions from Government Contractors, Initiative 54 (2008), which was approved in November 2008.[1]
Section 14
Text of Section 14:
Severability: If any provision of this article or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the article which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this article are declared to be severable.[1] |
Amendments
- Colorado Amendment 27, Campaign Finance Regulations (2002), which was approved in November 2002.
Section 15
Text of Section 15:
Because of a presumption of impropriety between contributions to any campaign and sole source government contracts, contract holders shall contractually agree, for the duration of the contract and for two years thereafter, to cease making, causing to be made, or inducing by any means, a contribution, directly or indirectly, on behalf of the contract holder or on behalf of his or her immediate family member and for the benefit of any political party or for the benefit of any candidate for any elected office of the state or any of its political subdivisions.[1] |
Amendments
- Colorado Campaign Contributions from Government Contractors, Initiative 54 (2008), which was approved in November 2008.
Section 16
Text of Section 16:
To aid in enforcement of this measure concerning sole source contracts, the executive director of the department of personnel shall promptly publish and maintain a summary of each sole source government contract issued. Any contract holder of a sole source government contract shall promptly prepare and deliver to the executive director of the department of personnel a true and correct "Government Contract Summary," in digital format as prescribed by that office, which shall identify the names and addresses of the contract holders and all other parties to the government contract, briefly describe the nature of the contract and goods or services performed, disclose the start and end date of the contract, disclose the contract's estimated amount or rate of payment, disclose the sources of payment, and disclose other information as determined by the executive director of the department of personnel which is not in violation of federal law, trade secrets or intellectual property rights. The executive director of the department of personnel is hereby given authority to promulgate rules to facilitate this section.[1] |
Amendments
- Colorado Campaign Contributions from Government Contractors, Initiative 54 (2008), which was approved in November 2008.
Section 17
Text of Section 17:
(1) Every sole source government contract by the state or any of its political subdivisions shall incorporate article XXVIII, section 15, into the contract. Any person who intentionally accepts contributions on behalf of a candidate committee, political committee, small donor committee, political party, or other entity, in violation of section 15 has engaged in corrupt misconduct and shall pay restitution to the general treasury of the contracting governmental entity to compensate the governmental entity for all costs and expenses associated with the breach, including costs and losses involved in securing a new contract if that becomes necessary. If a person responsible for the bookkeeping of an entity that has a sole source contract with a governmental entity, or if a person acting on behalf of the governmental entity, obtains knowledge of a contribution made or accepted in violation of section 15, and that person intentionally fails to notify the secretary of state or appropriate government officer about the violation in writing within ten business days of learning of such contribution, then that person may be contractually liable in an amount up to the above restitution. (2) Any person who makes or causes to be made any contribution intended to promote or influence the result of an election on a ballot issue shall not be qualified to enter into a sole source government contract relating to that particular ballot issue. (3) The parties shall agree that if a contract holder intentionally violates section 15 or section 17 (2), as contractual damages that contract holder shall be ineligible to hold any sole source government contract, or public employment with the state or any of its political subdivisions, for three years. The governor may temporarily suspend any remedy under this section during a declared state of emergency. (4) Knowing violation of section 15 or section 17 (2) by an elected or appointed official is grounds for removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit in the state, and shall constitute misconduct or malfeasance. (5) A registered voter of the state may enforce section 15 or section 17 (2) by filing a complaint for injunctive or declaratory relief or for civil damages and remedies, if appropriate, in the district court.[1] |
Amendments
- Colorado Campaign Contributions from Government Contractors, Initiative 54 (2008), which was approved in November 2008.
See also
- State constitution
- Constitutional article
- Constitutional amendment
- Constitutional revision
- Constitutional convention
- Amendments
External links
- Lexis Nexis, "Colorado Constitution"
- Constitution of the State of Colorado, as currently amended
- Colorado Experience: Colorado Constitution on Youtube
- List of constitutional amendments since 1912
- Huffington Post, "Colorado Constitution"
Additional reading
Footnotes
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